But he stoutly repudiates all vitalism : ' The inclusion of the special type of organization found in living systems within the sphere of Science has nothing whatever to do with vitalism, which posits some entity in addition to organizing relations/

Whether this statement is correct depends, of course, upon our definition of vitalism. If, with E. S. Russell, we defirxe vitalism as including all biological theory which finds it necessary to make use of conceptions that are not found to be necessary in physics, we should perhaps have to class Needham with the vitalists, in virtue of his recognition of ' the special type of organization found in living systems ' as the central problem of biology. A nice point, which illustrates what we noticed on an early page, namely, the impossibility of any longer drawing a sharp line between vitalists and non-vitalists.

Needham himself remarks : ' Up to the end of the last century it was the universal assumption that it would some day be possible to refer all natural motions back to the basic equations of classical mechanics. But we know now that, far from sociology being referable to mechanics by way of biology and physics [as Hogben vainly believes], physics itself has failed to conform to this artificial standard. Neither electrodynamics, atomic physics, nor quantum theory can be derived from the principles of classical mechanics. But because biology cannot now ever be in the strict sense mechanistic, we have no right to assume that it cannot be

causal, or that it cannot be mathematical.' To the latter proposition we may say, Of course not! Has not statistical treatment of social processes and changes long been established as of great value in the social sciences ?

Perhaps at this point it may be well to hear the voice